Putin's New Military Doctrine Doubles Down on Jedi Mind Tricks

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new formal Russian military doctrine the day after Christmas.

As a rule, a new formal military doctrine — a national statement on the order of "The World According to Me" — isn't usually an occasion where the national leadership shocks and amazes the world with bold and brash revelations. If you've been following the news closely, a new doctrine usually confirms a lot of what everyone was already thinking, with maybe an indication of where they see themselves going in the future. They usually read like any bureaucratic product reflecting consensus thinking.

The new Russian doctrine seems to fit the pattern. But while this version hasn't been the subject of nearly as much speculation as the doctrine signed in 2010 under previous president and present-day Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, which was the first modern Russian doctrine to really portray NATO as a threat, a pair of little-publicized decrees signed into law a few days later hint at what the Kremlin might really have in mind.

What I've seen so far (which isn't much until an English-language translation is available) broadly tracks the news of the last year, and is mostly unsurprising, involving as it does a much more direct expression of interest in the Arctic; increasing attention to precision weapons in the strategic context; and defining NATO and the United States as lead rivals in an era of increased global competition.

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What is slightly more interesting is the way the new doctrine defines modern warfare: the "complex application of military, political, economic, information and other non-military means… applying indirect and asymmetric means of action." This is Russian bureaucratese for what's sometimes called "hybrid warfare," "fifth-generation warfare," or —as I like to think of it — "Jedi mind tricks." In short, this is the kind of hazy, almost-but-not-quite variety of conflict we've seen unfold in Ukraine. Part special forces, part propaganda, part strong-arm intimidation, it's an almost-but-not-quite invasion designed to creep toward outright invasion without setting off the same alarm bells.

Russia has argued that these kinds of tactics were behind the "color revolutions" of the last 15 years or so, which have taken on regimes in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and which have all threatened (whether directly or indirectly) Russian interests. The country's new doctrine expresses concerns about those types of threats going forward, cautioning against "the activities of information influence on the population, especially young citizens of the country, which has the aim of undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of Fatherland."

This is notable amid the thicket of official verbiage because it's a reference about dealing with an internal threat, which is the sort of thing that is quietly directed to the Interior Ministry or secret police. At the furthest possible extreme, dark assertions of this sort could mean something nuts like laying the ground for the institution of martial law, or of major Russian military operations against the Russian public in the event of an uprising — but that's so unlikely as to verge on the absurd.

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It's the pair of decrees signed a few days after approval of the new doctrine that are a bit more interesting. The big one basically carves out ways to make it much easier for Russian-speaking foreigners to join the country's military. The decree (in Russian) apparently says, "Military men, who are foreign citizens, can participate in carrying out the tasks during military situations, and also during armed conflicts, in accordance with admitted principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation, and the Russian legislation."

Now, it could be that this is a kind of administrative loophole-closing measure. The same day this decree was put into effect, Putin signed another decree allowing for the recognition of prior military service among Crimeans. Together, the two documents appear to be a way of integrating Crimean paramilitary groups and militias and bringing them under the formal control of the Russian army. They suggest that they might be planning to induct all these Crimean folks with guns into the military.

If you'll indulge a little bit of speculation, this could have been useful during the "Invasion of the Little Green Men," when Russian forces without identifying insignia or flags spread throughout Crimea. It would have been useful for a force of LGM to go in and induct further tranches of LGM in the field, so there would be actual local people participating in the so-called "local militias."

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Alternatively, expanding the ability to recruit foreign nationals might prove valuable in eastern Ukraine today, bringing various paramilitary groups there under more direct Russian control. From the Kremlin's point of view, that might be better than the current situation where Russian army "volunteers" fight alongside and guide Ukrainian separatists. This change in regulations could be a way of consolidating all of the forces fighting against Kiev.

A more exotic (and far less likely) possibility involves the well-established tactic of employing foreigners to knock heads during internal uprisings. During the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, local units were rotated out in favor of army units from the Western China with few ties to the protesting students. More recently, rumors of Cuban military involvement surrounded this summer's protests in Venezuela. So there is a slim outside chance that this thinking might be animating Russian interest in foreign recruits.

The least likely but most entertaining possibility is the establishment of a Russian Foreign Legion, patterned off of the French Foreign Legion. A well-disciplined, well-trained military force composed of troops whose parents and relatives live far, far away from Moscow (and are unlikely to take to the streets when word of casualties starts coming back) might become appealing if Russia grows increasingly involved in messy little colonial wars in the former Soviet republics. But a full-blown French Foreign Legion-style setup, complete with "Legion Is Our Fatherland" mottos and enlistment under assumed identities, is a pretty huge step.

Unlike the French Foreign Legion, Russian regulations require that enlistees speak the Russian language, and officials are not prepared to recruit from the ranks of the cutthroats and ne'er-do-wells, if Russian reports are to be taken at face-value. Foreigners under investigation or being tried in court cannot join the military; prison time and a past criminal record are also disqualifications.

So it doesn't look like the Kremlin is just out to swell its ranks or build a contingent for fighting nasty colonial wars. The best guess is that the main intent is to augment Russian hybrid warfare capabilities by better integrating Russian-speaking foreigners in disputed territories into the country's command structure.

That said, there are two potential developments to monitor that would change the outlook: a sudden loosening of requirements for language and criminal background, and the establishment of large units heavily (or almost entirely) populated by foreign volunteers. The emergence of such initiatives would indicate that Moscow is probably fixing to get right smack dab in the middle of some messy foreign adventures.

Follow Ryan Faith on Twitter: @Operation_Ryan

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